Applying the Full Protection and Security Standard of International Investment Law to Digital Assets by Collins, D. A.
Collins, D. A. (2011). Applying the Full Protection and Security Standard of International Investment 
Law to Digital Assets. Journal of World Investment and Trade, 12(2), 225 - 244.
City Research Online
Original citation: Collins, D. A. (2011). Applying the Full Protection and Security Standard of 
International Investment Law to Digital Assets. Journal of World Investment and Trade, 12(2), 225 - 
244.
Permanent City Research Online URL: http://openaccess.city.ac.uk/627/
 
Copyright & reuse
City  University  London has developed City  Research Online  so that  its  users  may access the 
research outputs of City University London's staff. Copyright © and Moral Rights for this paper are 
retained by the individual author(s) and/ or other copyright holders. Users may download and/ or print 
one  copy  of  any  article(s)  in  City  Research  Online  to  facilitate  their  private  study  or  for  non-
commercial research. Users may not engage in further distribution of the material or use it for any 
profit-making activities or any commercial gain. All material in City Research Online is checked for 
eligibility for copyright before being made available in the live archive. URLs from City Research 
Online may be freely distributed and linked to from other web pages. 
Versions of research
The version in City Research Online may differ from the final published version. Users are advised to 
check the Permanent City Research Online URL above for the status of the paper.
Enquiries
If you have any enquiries about any aspect of City Research Online, or if you wish to make contact  
with the author(s) of this paper, please email the team at publications@city.ac.uk.
Electronic copy available at: http://ssrn.com/abstract=1672709
 1 
Applying the Full Protection and Security Standard of 
Protection to Digital Investments 
 
by David Collins* 
 
ABSTRACT:  This article considers the possibility that digital assets of foreign 
investors such as websites and computer systems could be protected by the full 
protection and security (‘FPS’) standard common to many bilateral investment 
treaties.  Such assets can properly be described as investments and the flexible nature 
of the FPS standard observed in recent arbitration practice could be extended to cover 
civil disturbances such as cyber attacks against companies.  The article considers host 
state liability with respect to the prevention of harm to digital assets as well as failure 
to enforce laws that prohibit it.  The lack of governmental control over websites 
suggests that it would be difficult to ascribe state liability under an FPS clause, except 
possibly in situations of large scale internet infrastructure collapse. A duty to 
prosecute attacks against digital assets, while common to many jurisdictions and seen 
in international instruments, is inappropriate as an investment treaty claim because of 
difficulties in compensation. The FPS standard further appears to incorporate a degree 
of contextual proportionality linked to the host state’s resources and this may prevent 
successful claims against Developing States where many cyber attacks occur. 
 
 
 
 
I   Introduction 
In international investment law, the phrase Full Protection and Security (‘FPS’) refers 
to a standard of protection for foreign investments that provides security against 
physical damage that may occur to a foreign investors’ property arising from war or 
civil unrest in the host state. The FPS standard are now common to many of the more 
than two thousand Bilateral Investment Treaties (‘BIT’)s concluded between states to 
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 2 
attract foreign direct investment (‘FDI’) and protect multinational investors.1  While 
the FPS standard was traditionally held to govern the physical security of investors’ 
tangible assets, this understanding may need to be modified to fit the nature of 
security threats faced by investors in the 21st Century, namely the integrity of digital 
investments like computer systems and websites from attacks levied through or 
against the internet.  However, as we shall see, by extending FPS protection in this 
manner, a host state’s fulfilment of its FPS commitment in a treaty instrument may 
involve security undertakings that are beyond its economic capacity, especially in the 
case of Developing States, where many so-called ‘cyber attacks’ are believed to 
originate.   
This article will examine the nature and scope of the FPS standard as it has 
developed in international investment law, including recent arbitral decisions that 
appear to extend its scope as well as apply it in a contextual manner.  Outlining the 
phenomenon of organized attacks against websites and computer systems through the 
internet, the article will link this to the FPS’s concept of civil disturbance as well as to 
the observed extensions to the FPS standard.  The host state’s associated duty to 
prevent damage to digital assets and to prosecute them once they have transpired will 
be discussed in light of trends in international law as it relates to internet security.  
The article will conclude with an assessment of the way in which such obligations 
may be modified in the case of Developing States because of the FPS standard’s 
proportionality to particular societal circumstances.  Before embarking on the analysis 
of the application of the FPS standard to an age of digital investments, we will first 
establish that foreign investors’ digital assets, such as websites and computer systems, 
                                                
1
 J Salacuse, The Law of Investment Treaties, (OUP, 2010) at 210; C Schreuer and R Dolzer, Principles 
of International Investment Law (OUP, 2008) at 149, M Sornarajah, The International Law on Foreign 
Investment (CUP, 2010) at 359 
 3 
should be viewed as investments for the purposes of international investment law and 
accordingly attract the protections afforded by BIT provisions like the FPS standard. 
 
II   Digital Assets as Investments 
In order for a foreign investor’s digital assets such as websites and computer systems 
to be protected by its home state’s investment treaty commitments, it must first be 
established that these constitute ‘investments’ as defined under the relevant treaty.  
While this will depend obviously on the specific wording of the BIT in question, 
some common principles emerge from treaty practice.  Most BITs contain a general 
phrase defining investments as constituting ‘all assets’ with several groups of 
illustrative categories. Relevant for the purposes of websites and other computer data 
systems are treaty references to intangible property as well as movable and 
intellectual property.2 Digital investments such as websites could be viewed as a 
species of intellectual property in as much as they are the products of technical 
knowledge and often artistic creativity.  The BIT between Argentina and the United 
States includes the expansive phrase: ‘inventions in all fields of human endeavour’ 
and ‘confidential business information’ in its definition of intellectual property.3 
Under the BIT between the Ukraine and Denmark, an investment is stated to mean 
every kind of asset connected with economic activities for the purpose of establishing 
lasting economic relations,4 which would seem to cover websites and computer 
systems as long as they were connected to a commercial activity with a long term 
time frame, which may mean more than simply a few transactions.  Salacuse writes 
that these rather broad, open-ended definitions are intended to provide as wide a range 
                                                
2
 Schreuer and Dolzer, ibid at 63; Salacuse, ibid at 160.  Examples of such a definition can be found in 
article 1(6) of the European Energy Charter Treaty and Art 1(1) of the 2001 BIT between Germany and 
Bosnia Herzegovina. 
3
 Art 1 iv (entered into force 20 October 2004) 
4
 Art 1 (entered into force 23 Oct 1992) 
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of investment forms as possible.5 Even if an alleged investment does not fall within 
any of the categories specified in the treaty, it may still qualify for BIT protection 
unless it falls into a category of things that are explicitly not investments, such as the 
extension of credit or claims to money, as outlined in the North American Free Trade 
Agreement (‘NAFTA’),6 exceptions which are not relevant here.  
Additional common characteristics of investments that appear in treaties 
include the commitment of capital or other resources, the expectation of gain or profit 
or the assumption of risk.7 These criteria are also reflected in Article 25 of the 
International Centre for the Settlement of Investment Disputes (‘ICSID’) Convention, 
giving that tribunal competence over disputes.  Clearly a website or computer system 
is implemented by a company for the purpose of earning a profit, possibly unless it 
was for charitable purposes relating to a discrete project.  Of course the investment 
must be controlled by a foreign investor; however there is no additional requirement 
that the investment itself must be foreign in terms of its origin.8 Neither of these 
criteria should be contentious with respect to digital assets. 
 BIT commitments are typically restricted to investments made within the 
territory of the respective contracting parties.9 This practice exists because an 
investment is meant to benefit the economy of a host state, either by bringing in 
capital or creating new jobs10 in a manner that simply trading goods or services would 
not.  Territoriality is a more problematic attribute to ascribe to a website on the 
internet, which may simply be accessible by consumers in the host state as a means of 
advertising foreign goods or services.  Such on-line advertisement alone may still be 
                                                
5
 Salacuse, above note 1 at 162 
6
 Art 1139 (entered into force 1 January 1994)  
7
 Seen for example in Article 1 of the US – Uruguay BIT,  (entered into force 20 October 1994) 
8
 Schreuer and Dolzer, above note1 at 67-68 referring to the Tradex v Albania award, 5 ICSID Reports 
70, (29 April 1995) 
9
 Seen for example in Art 1 of Canada-Peru BIT (2006) 
10
 Salacuse, above note 1 at 169 
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sufficient, provided that the company itself has a physical presence in the territory, 
such as an office or factory.  As such the focus of the investigation into the 
territoriality would not be the ‘location’ of the website on the internet,11 but rather the 
location of the company with which it was associated.  For the purposes of 
international investment law and investment treaty interpretation, however, likely the 
strongest claim that a website is within the territory of a state for the purposes of 
attracting BIT protection would be where the website is hosted by a server physically 
located within the host state, which would appear to follow the conventional 
understanding of internet jurisdiction.12  Therefore, following the reasoning of the 
arbitration tribunal in SGS v Pakistan, it would assist the investor’s claim of 
territoriality if evidence of expenditures to establish the investment within the host 
state could be adduced.13 Thus an investor might demonstrate that it had paid a local 
web hosting company to host its website, or that it had purchased or leased local 
property to house the relevant server. In contrast, if the website was simply accessible 
within the jurisdiction through the internet, the link to the jurisdiction would likely be 
too tenuous, especially if the company had no physical presence within the territory.  
It is perhaps more obvious to assert that a computer network for a company that is 
physically located in the territory of the host state, such as the computer systems 
maintaining the functionality of an oil company, would satisfy the territoriality 
requirement because they are obviously within the borders of a party state.   
                                                
11
 It is beyond the scope of this article to consider jurisdictional issues relating to the internet, which is 
a highly complex subject that has received much attention by scholars.  See further e.g. M Sussman, 
‘The Critical Challenge from International High-Tech and Computer Related Crime at the Millenium’ 
9 Duke Journal of International and Comparative Law 451 (1999) and R August, ‘International Cyber-
Jurisdiction: A Comparative Analysis’ 39 America Business Law Journal 531 (2002); and D Powers, 
‘Cyberlaw: The Major Areas, Development and Information Security Aspects’ in H Bidgoli ed Global 
Perspectives in Information Security (John Wiley and Sons Inc., NJ, USA, 2009) 
12
 As generally observed by commentators, ibid. 
13
 SGS Society Generale de Surveillance SA v Islamic Republic of Pakistan, ICSID Case No 
ARB/01/13 (6 Aug 2003) at [137] under the Swiss-Pakistan BIT (entered into force 6 May 1996) 
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Given the very broad language used to define investments in BIT practice, 
digital assets such as websites and computer systems should be viewed as investments 
and consequently covered by BIT provisions, provided that they serve a commercial 
purpose and that there is a meaningful territorial link to the host state.  Digital 
investments therefore can in theory attract the protection of FPS clauses that appear in 
standard investment treaties.  Before applying the FPS standard to digital investments, 
we must explore the precise meaning of the FPS clause as it has developed in 
international investment law. 
 
III   The FPS Standard Elaborated 
Unlike other standards of investment protection found in international treaties, such as 
that of Fair and Equitable Treatment (‘FET’) (essentially due process) and guarantees 
against expropriation (government takings), there has been remarkably little academic 
treatment of the FPS standard.14  While FPS is expressed in a variety of different ways 
in various treaties,15 it is often evaluated in conjunction with the FET standard, as if 
the former standard merely expands and elaborates upon more general concepts of fair 
treatment contained in the latter.16  FPS also often appears in BITs in the same 
provision regarding compensation for expropriation.17  Further investigation reveals 
that FPS is a stand alone obligation relating to fairly specific types of situations and 
harm suffered.  While some commentators have observed that it is becoming 
increasingly difficult to discern how minimum standard provisions in BITs, such as 
                                                
14
 Possibly the only example of academic commentary exclusively on FPS is a chapter by G Cordero 
Moss in A Reinisch ed, Standards of Investment Protection (OUP, 2008). 
15
 Cordero Moss, ibid at 133-134 
16
 E.g. S Subedi, International Investment Law: Reconciling Policy and Principle (Hart, Oregon, 2008)  
at 134, A Qureshi and A Ziegler, International Economic Law (2d ed, Thomson Sweet & Maxwell, 
2007) at 400  
17
 E.g. German Model BIT Art 4 <http://ita.law.uvic.ca/investmenttreaties.htm> (last accessed 
September 2010) 
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FPS are actually being interpreted and applied,18 some general features of the FPS 
standard have emerged that should operate as guidance in future investment treaty 
practice. 
 
i) Background and Relationship to Customary International Law 
The FPS standard was seen as early as the 1833 Friendship, Commerce and 
Navigation Treaty between the United States and Chile19 and the first BIT, concluded 
between Germany and Pakistan in 1959 contains an FPS clause.20  The FPS standard 
appeared in these early treaties in response to various waves of outright and creeping 
expropriations of the assets of Western companies in the Developing world, 
eventually becoming a norm in most BITs.21  The invocation of state responsibility for 
the omission of the state to provide protection to aliens existed in international law 
before the explosion of BITs seen in the early 21st Century.  Indeed it was explicitly 
recognized by the International Court of Justice in the Tehran Hostages Case.22 
The precise wording of the clause has varied from treaty to treaty, sometimes the 
word ‘full’ is omitted in favour of ‘constant’ and others put ‘security’ before 
‘protection’.23   
Many investment treaties link the FPS standard to general international law, 
whereas some treaties speak of protection and security as well as treatment in 
                                                
18
 T Grierson-Weiler and  I Laird, ‘Standards of Treatment’ in P Muchlinski, F Ortino and C Schreuer 
eds. Oxford Handbook of International Investment Law (OUP, 2008) at 261 and T Weiler, International 
Investment Arbitration (Cameron & May, 2005) at 667 where FPS and FET are described as ‘malleable 
concepts’.  
19
 Art X.  See also US / Paraguay Treaty of Friendship Commerce and Navigation of 1859 Art IX 
20
 Treaty for Promotion and Protection of Investment (West German – Pakistan) Art 3(2) (signed 25 
November 1959) 
21
 Subedi, above note 16 at 133.  See e.g. The Friendship, Commerce and Navigation Treaty between 
Italy and Venezuela (1861) and the Traité d’Amité de Commerce et de Navigation (France / Mexico) 
1886 
22
 Case Concerning US Diplomatic and Consular Staff in Tehran (US v Iran) (Merits) [1980] ICJ Rep 
3 
23
 Schreuer and Dolzer, above note 1 at 149 
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accordance with international law as though they were separate and distinct 
standards.24 The provision of protection to investors against physical harm has been 
viewed as an embodiment of customary international law standards relating to the 
protection of aliens.25  This is particularly seen in customary international law as 
developed by the United States.26  Montt has gone so far as to suggest that the FPS 
standard was simply another way of referring to the traditional international minimum 
standard of protection provided in customary international law.  He claims that FPS 
corresponded to indirect responsibility of states, meaning failures to maintain public 
order and to operate the system of criminal law that were seen as core responsibilities 
of states in the 19th Century.  Direct responsibility, meaning the duty to proactively 
act to protect foreign investors, was therefore a feature of the more general FET 
standard.27  In contrast, Subedi writes that FPS, like FET is meant to imply that 
foreign investors are entitled to protection over and above their entitlement to non-
discriminatory treatment under international law.28  
The controversy regarding whether the FPS standard is autonomous or merely 
incorporates customary international law has led to some investment treaties 
addressing the issue directly. NAFTA states that FPS does not require treatment in 
addition to or beyond that which is required by the customary international law 
minimum standard of treatment of aliens.29 The NAFTA Free Trade Commission 
reiterates that the FPS clause in NAFTA represents the current manifestation of the 
customary international law minimum standard.30 Canada’s Model Treaty Art 5.2 and 
                                                
24
 C Schreuer and Dolzer, above note 1 at 152 
25
 Sornarajah, above note 1 at 237 
26
 Sornarajah, ibid at 342 
27
 S Montt, State Liability in Investment Treaty Arbitration: Global Constitutional Administrative Law 
in the BIT Generation (Hart: Oregon, 2009) at 70 
28
 Subedi, above note 16 at 134.  This is reflected for example in the text of NAFTA, see below note 30 
29
 Above note 6 at Art 1105(1) 
30
 NAFTA Free Trade Commission Notes of Interpretation of Certain Chapter 11 Provisions (NAFTA 
Free Trade Commission, 31 July 2001) 
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US Model Treaty Art 2 b) states that the FPS standard is only that provided by 
customary international law.  Similarly the Central American Free Trade Agreement 
outlines that FPS requires each Party to provide the level of police protection required 
under customary international law.31 This would appear to suggest that there is some 
bare minimum level of protection against civil unrest that a state must offer foreigners 
who cross its borders.  Some commentators have claimed that FPS protection in BITs 
expanded upon the existing international minimum standard, requiring host states to 
proactively defend investors against others.32 This is in keeping with the theory that 
BITs are themselves a lex specialis which are separate from general international law.  
 
ii) The Content of the Standard 
As noted above, the FPS standard traditionally referred to the need to protect the 
investor against various form of physical violence resulting from war or civil 
disturbances, including the invasion of the premises of the investment.33  This can be 
seen as a dual standard in as much as harm can befall an investment either through 
direct action of the state, or by its failure to protect when harm has come from 
somewhere else. Schreuer and Dolzer suggests that FPS clauses establish the host 
state’s obligation to take active measures to protect the investment from adverse 
effects, which may have been caused either by the actions of the host state or by third 
parties.34  Thus the Iran-US Claims tribunal established that the failure to provide 
protection to an alien who is threatened by violence creates responsibility in the host 
                                                
31
 Art 10.1(2).  The term ‘police protection’ is used to describe the FPS standard in Art 2 b) of the US 
Model Investment Treaty, <http://ita.law.uvic.ca/investmenttreaties.htm> (last accessed September 
2010) 
32
 A Lowenfeld, International Economic Law (2d ec Oxford, 2008) at 558 and S Subedi, above note 16 
at 57 
33
 Schreuer and Dolzer, above note 1 at 149 
34
 Schreuer and Dolzer, ibid at 149 
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state, whether the duty is not fulfilled either negligently or wilfully.35  The irrelevance 
of direct causality in the breach of the standard must be emphasized – it does not 
matter that the host state itself did not cause the damage, as long as the damage 
occurred within its territory.36  This dual nature of the standard can be found in its 
historic origins in the political volatility of Latin America of the 20th Century.  First, 
the investor’s property must not be harmed by action of the host state’s military (duty 
not to harm), and second, the investor’s property must be protected against the actions 
of a riotous mob (affirmative duty to protect).37 The responsibility to ensure that 
foreign investors’ property is not damaged exists irrespective of the lack of 
connection between the state and the party which caused the injury.  This view should 
be contrasted with the principle drawn from International Law Commission’s Draft 
Articles on State Responsibility stating that actions of private parties do not normally 
engage the international responsibility of the state.38  Still, under international law if 
an attack by a third party was foreseeable, then a duty of protection is owed to an 
alien.39 Thus the FPS standard contemplates a state’s responsibility for the 
consequences of actions of private parties because of a failure of its police or other 
such agencies charged with maintaining peace.  The state will have a duty to prevent 
the harm-causing action by the private entity.40  
The FPS standard of protection against physical damage is rooted in the state’s 
failure to exercise a proper level of care, or ‘due diligence.’41  Although FPS has been 
                                                
35
 Sornarajah, above note 1 at 342 
36
 Cordero Moss, above note 14 at 138.  
37
 Sornarajah, above note 1 at 134 
38
 International Law Commission Draft Articles on Responsibility of States for Internationally 
Wrongful Acts, 2001 Art 4.  
<http://untreaty.un.org/ilc/texts/instruments/english/draft%20articles/9_6_2001.pdf> (last accessed 
September 2010) 
39
 Home Missionary Society Case (1920) 6 UNRIAA 20 
40
 Weiler, International Investment Arbitration, above note 18 at 679 
41
 C McLachlan, L Shore, M Weiniger, International Investment Arbitration: Substantive Principles 
(OUP, 2007) at 247 
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referred to as an absolute standard of treatment,42 the ‘due diligence’ approach 
suggests that the host state must only make its best efforts to protect foreign investors 
from physical harm that may result from civil unrest or other such disturbances.43  
Accordingly, a violation of FPS is dependant on whether the state exercised a 
reasonable level of effort in affording protection to foreign investors.  Liability will 
therefore exist in the state if a capacity to exercise control exists and there was a 
failure to exercise that control.44  Commentators have noted a reluctance on the part of 
investment tribunals to extend the FPS standard beyond the requirement of due 
diligence.45   
In this sense, under an FPS obligation, the host state must demonstrate that it 
has taken all measures of precaution to protect the investment of the investor and its 
territory; there is no strict liability imposed upon the state.46  As indicated by a 
tribunal of the Permanent Court of Arbitration: ‘the [FPS] standard obliges the host 
state to adopt all reasonable measures to protect assets and property from threats or 
attacks which may target particularly foreigners or certain groups of foreigners.’47  
The ICJ later stated that a reference to ‘full protection and security’ could not be 
viewed as a warranty that property should never be disturbed under any 
circumstances, with emergencies or wars being the most obvious defences.48  Cordero 
Moss suggests that this limitation should characterize a state’s FPS duty as an 
‘obligation of means’ – the extent to which a host state must provide security will be 
                                                
42
 T Grierson-Weiler and I Laird, above note 18 at 263 
43
 E.g. Montt above note 27 at 70 
44
 Wena Hotels Ltd v Arab Republic of Egypt, ICSID Case No. ARB/98/4 [84] 
45
 McLachlan, Shore and Weiniger, above note 41 at 250 
46
 Noble Ventures v Romania, ICSID Case No. ARB/01/11(12 Oct 2005) at [164] 
47
 Saluka Investments (The Netherlands) v the Czech Republic (Partial Award, 17 March 2006) [483] 
and [484].  Here the measures taken by the host state were viewed as a reasonable response under the 
circumstances. 
48
 Electronica Sicula SpA (ELSI) (USA v Italy) ICJ Reports 1989 at [108] 
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linked to its resources. 49  As such, in his words: ‘the state enjoys a rather wide 
discretion to discharge this obligation in accordance with its own sovereign 
appreciation.’50  This contextual approach to the FPS standard is highly relevant when 
assessing internet security in impoverished states.  Before examining that issue, it is 
illustrative to consider some of the leading arbitration decisions that have considered 
the FPS standard and the types of situations in which it will operate. 
 
iii) Some Leading Arbitration Decisions on FPS 
It should be noted that the language of a BIT is not the decisive factor in 
understanding the scope of application of the standard,51 thus arbitration decisions 
will be highly relevant in applying the FPS to digital assets affected by cyber attacks. 
AMT v Zaire52 concerned a dispute initiated under the US-Zaire BIT brought 
due to the alleged failure of Zaire to protect the US investor from property damage 
sustained as a result of activities of the Zairian armed forces in Kinshasa.  Zaire 
claimed that it had not violated the FPS standard because it had not treated AMT any 
less favourably than it treated other investors, including nationals and those from 
other countries.  The ICSID tribunal held that Zaire had breached the FPS provision 
because it had taken no measures whatsoever to ensure the protection of AMT’s 
property and the fact that the host state had also failed to protect other investors was 
irrelevant.  It was important to the tribunal’s conclusion that the losses sustained by 
AMT were caused by actions of Zaire’s armed forces acting individually and not in 
their official capacity as the Zairian military, and as such their actions did not fall 
within the combat operations exception to the standard contained in the BIT.  As in 
                                                
49
 Cordero Moss, above note 14 at 139 
50
 Cordero Moss, ibid at 150 
51
 Cordero Moss, ibid at 134-135 
52
 ICSID Case No. Arb/93/1 (1997) (10 February 1997) [hereinafter AMT] 
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this situation, FPS clauses in investment treaties may contain built-in exceptions for 
the host state, such as warfare. Similarly, a declaration of an emergency situation, 
because of a national security threat, such as might arise during a serious attack 
against a country’s internet, could potentially obviate the host state from its FPS 
obligations. 
In Asian Agricultural Products (AAPL) v Sri Lanka53 the tribunal examined 
the FPS clause in a BIT between the UK and Sri Lanka which was engaged because 
of property damage suffered by the British Hong Kong shrimp farm during an armed 
Tamil uprising.  The tribunal held that the phrase ‘full protection’ in a BIT did not 
refer to any standards higher than the minimum standard of treatment in required by 
general international law.  In times of civil conflicts, there was a duty on the part of 
the host state to confer adequate protection to foreign investment and that the failure 
to give such protection will engage the liability of the state, namely to compensate the 
investor for damage suffered.  This obligation, existing independently of the express 
FPS, was violated by Sri Lanka.  The FPS provision in this dispute was unhelpful to 
the investor, largely because it was included with a wide exception: no compensation 
would be payable if the damage resulted from necessary combat action taken by the 
host state’s military, which included the action taken against the Tamil rebels.   
A similar approach was taken by an ICSID tribunal in Noble Ventures v 
Romania54, where it was held that a FPS clause should not be understood as being 
wider in scope than the general duty to provide protection and security to foreign 
nationals found in the customary international law of aliens. The tribunal stated that in 
order to claim FPS it was necessary to demonstrate that the measure implemented by 
the host state that caused the damage was directed specifically against a certain 
                                                
53
 (1992) 17 YCA 106 [hereinafter AAP] 
54
 ICSID Case No. ARB/01/11(Award) 12 Oct 2005) [hereinafter Noble Ventures] 
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investor by reason of its nationality.55  Thus if all investors are injured during a 
widespread attack against the country itself, then FPS may not be engaged. 
The FPS standard received some consideration in the Wena Hotels v Egypt56 
dispute brought by a British company against Egypt for the country’s failure to 
prevent the state-owned Egyptian Hotels Corporation attacks against the hotel’s 
properties.  Guests of the hotels had been forcibly evicted and property damaged due 
to political unrest.  Although the investor could not establish that the host state had 
actually participated in the attacks against the hotels, Egypt was held liable for breach 
of the FPS standard because it was aware of the hotel seizures and yet did nothing to 
prevent them.57  
Azurix v Argentina58 concerned breaches of a water and sewer concession 
granted by an Argentinean province in favour of a US corporation.  Panic ensued 
among the public when an algae outbreak occurred, causing citizens to break 
contracts with the water supplier.  Finding a breach of the FPS standard in the host 
state’s conduct in failing to complete work on systems critical to algae removal as 
well as exacerbating the public’s response to the events, the tribunal noted that 
although other arbitration tribunals had clearly limited the FPS standard to a baseline 
level of police protection, it could be extended under the applicable US-Argentina 
BIT.  Importantly, FPS did not simply concern physical protection but also contained 
a further requirement that host governments ensure the ‘stability afforded by a secure 
investment environment,’59 although the precise feature of the BIT that led to this 
conclusion is not explored.  It is significant that the Azurix dispute predated the 
                                                
55
 Ibid at [111] 
56
 ICSID Case No. ARB/98/4 (8 December 2000) 
57
 Ibid at [84] – [95] 
58
 ICSID Case no. ARB/01/12 (14 July 2006) [hereinafter Azurix] 
59
 Ibid at [408] 
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Argentinean economic crisis and therefore had no relation to any emergency measures 
taken by the state in that regard. 
Finally, the recent ICSID decision Pantechniki v Albania60 concerning riots by 
citizens (following the collapse of a government run Ponzi scheme) which damaged 
an investor’s remote road works project suggests that an element of proportionality is 
required when assessing violations of the FPS standard, an issue to which we will 
return below.  Proportionality is needed because, unlike denials of justice which result 
from a conscious lack of diligence with respect to governance, a failure in providing 
protection and security is likely to arise in: 
 
‘an unpredictable instance of civil disorder which could have been readily 
controlled by a powerful state but which overwhelms the limited capacity of 
one which is poor and vulnerable…[I]t seems difficult to maintain that a 
government incurs international responsibility for failure to plan for 
unprecedented trouble of unprecedented magnitude in unprecedented places.’61  
 
 
Consequently a host state should not bear international responsibility for the failure to 
respond to a violent incident that is wholly unprecedented in nature and size.  Thus 
under FPS the host state must exercise the level of due diligence of a country in 
similar circumstances, a feature that becomes relevant when applying the standard to 
Developing States.   
Having now established a sense of what the FPS standard has come to mean in 
international investment law, we will now consider how it might be applied to provide 
protection against modern threats to digital investments. 
    
IV   ‘Cyber Attacks’ as Civil Disturbances 
                                                
60
 ICSID Case no. ARB/07/21 (30 July 2009) [hereinafter Pantechniki] 
61
 Ibid at [77] 
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There is a voluminous amount of academic literature on legal issues raised by attacks 
against perpetrated through the internet, so-called ‘cyber attacks’.62 Suffice it to say 
that instances of cyber attacks against corporations and governments are becoming 
commonplace as the level of sophistication of malevolent software increases. Some 
high profile examples of cyber attacks can be mentioned briefly.  A series of cyber 
attacks against three US oil companies, including Exxon Mobile, were initiated in 
early 2010 from network servers located in China for the purpose of obtaining data on 
the location and precise value of oil discoveries.63 In February 2010, the computers of 
nearly 2,800 companies were breached by ‘hackers’ located in Europe, allowing them 
access to sensitive personal data, including that of customers. An unidentified 
Australian multinational financial company was attacked through the internet in 2010, 
allegedly from within China, disabling that company’s server for several hours.64 
Similar attacks occurring in recent years have been launched from ‘infected’ 
computers located in states such as China, Egypt, Mexico, Saudi Arabia and Turkey, 
where the risk of detection by authorities is thought to be low.65   
Cyber attacks are not always linked to theft of information but may be simply 
intended to damage property, possibly for political or ideological reasons, so-called 
‘cyber terrorism’.  Highly publicized cyber attacks were launched against the state of 
Estonia in 2007 and Georgia in 2008, both believed to have originated from Russia, 
rendering the internet inoperative and bringing parts of these countries to a standstill. 
These attacks were thought to be successful because of increasing sophistication of 
cyber terrorists as well as the lack of preparedness of the Estonian and Georgian 
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governments.66  Politically motivated attacks can also be directed against commercial 
organizations. Perhaps the most notorious destructive cyber attack against a company 
was levied in early 2010 against Google China by hackers within that country, 
allegedly intending to disable the e-mail accounts of human rights protesters.67  If not 
deserving of the description ‘war’, these instances call to mind the notion of a ‘civil 
disturbance’ in the tradition of the FPS standard, especially where the effect is a 
widespread one, interfering with the proper functioning of an important element of 
civil society.   
In addition to the obvious danger posed by cyber attacks in situations where 
vital infrastructure systems are concerned, cyber attacks can be very costly to private 
parties, such as foreign investors located within the affected region.  Disrupted 
websites can cost suppliers lost contracts as well as damage to reputation.  
Interference with computer systems could disable production as well as damage 
associated physical assets.  Foreign investors might be particularly vulnerable given 
the level of resource commitments relative to profit in the early years of an overseas 
project. A report by the US Congressional Research Service determined that attacks 
against computer systems resulted in an average shareholder loss for publicly traded 
corporations between US$50 million and $200 million.68 This figure does include the 
injury that may be inflicted on companies’ reputations due to a cyber attack, which 
could be incredibly damaging to the banking sector where the security of customer’s 
details is an essential component of the service. Clearly foreign investors stand to 
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suffer significant financial losses through internet-based criminal damage against 
digital assets like websites and computer systems,  
Instances of civil disturbances that have led to findings of FPS violations 
appear to involve situations in which there was a violent situation and resulting 
damage to the investor’s property was an indirect consequence of a larger conflict.  
Thus a purposeful, targeted criminal attack against a particular firm’s website might 
not fit within this model.  The application of widespread cyber attacks to the FPS 
standard must also be balanced by observed limitations on the standard associated 
with emergency situations, as in AMT.  Collapse of internet infrastructure could be 
viewed as an emergency situation, which could relinquish the state from its treaty 
obligations to protect foreign investors.  Furthermore, a large scale cyber attack that 
affects all investors, not just foreign ones, may fail the test established in Noble 
Ventures, which suggests that foreigners must be disproportionately injured during an 
instance of public disorder such as a catastrophic assault on internet communications. 
The applicability of emergency type defences will depend on the nature of the disaster 
and the proportionality of the measures taken in response to it. 
If it is to be asserted that foreign investors should expect protection from such 
civil disturbances by the host states in which they operate, then in the absence of 
express promises to that effect in the language of the BIT, traditional assurances 
offered by the common FPS standard must be enlarged.  This trend has been observed 
with arbitration tribunals demonstrating an ‘expansionary interpretation’ of the FPS 
standard.69 For example, as noted above, the Azurix tribunal established that FPS may 
be breached even if no physical violence or damage occurs.  It stated  
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 It is not only a matter of physical security; the stability afforded by 
 a secure investment environment is as important from an investor’s 
 point of view …where the terms ‘protection and security’ are qualified 
 by ‘full’ and no other adjective or explanation, they extend, in their 
 ordinary meaning, the content of this standard beyond physical security.70 
 
A stable investment environment could conceivably contemplate the integrity of 
internet infrastructure generally, and a digital asset such as a computer network could 
be precisely the type of investment susceptible to non-physical security breaches.  In 
another dispute Siemens v Argentina, the tribunal held that FPS could cover 
investments of an intangible nature, concluding however that: ‘it is difficult to 
understand how the physical security of an intangible asset would be achieved.’71  It 
seems that computer networks and websites precisely fit into this notion, although 
they are not physical in the sense of solid and dimensional, they can be damaged in a 
measurable way.  We will now consider the extent to which FPS obligations might 
actually serve this purpose in light of host governments’ role in these areas. 
 
 
V   Host State Liability under an FPS Obligation 
Under the FPS standard, the host state must use due diligence in its provision of 
protection and security for foreign investments.  In terms of digital investments, this 
obligation can be broadly divided into the host state government’s obligation to 
prevent damage to the assets of foreign investors and its obligation to detect and 
prosecute those who have inflicted it.   
 
i) Obligation to Prevent Harm to Digital Investments 
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It may be suggested that under an FPS clause the host state has a duty to prevent harm 
inflicted upon digital assets by providing a secure on-line environment, meaning one 
that impairs the ability of cyber criminals to launch attacks successfully.  If the server 
that hosts a foreign investor’s website is located within the territory, as per 
establishing BIT coverage, it could be argued that the host government has a 
responsibility to ensure that the websites which it hosts are not attacked.  Following 
this line of thought, commentators such have urged that computer network security 
should be understood as a public good,72 which suggests it is a beneficial and normal 
aspect of a functioning society. This characterization is especially relevant in that host 
states seek to provide a stable environment for foreign investments as a means of 
augmenting their own economic position.  In that sense internet security is a means to 
by which the integrity of the economic system of the state is achieved, including that 
system’s capacity to attract foreign capital. A stable investment environment is 
offered to investors in exchange for the economic advantages it brings. 
Moreover, it could be argued that the need to maintain an adequate level of 
protection against cyber crimes features in international legal instruments, which may 
be indicative of what a reasonably secure digital environment should be for the 
purpose of establishing an FPS standard, or an international minimum standard, if that 
is what FPS is taken to mean.  The 2002 Organization for Economic Cooperation and 
Development (‘OECD’) Guidelines for the Security of Information Systems and 
Networks recommended that states should implement rapid and effective co-operation 
to prevent criminal attacks that arise in an on-line environment.73  The UN also 
enacted resolutions aimed at curtailing terrorist activity instigated through the 
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internet, such as may damage the functionality of computer systems.74 In light of 
these instruments, it could be suggested that in accepting an FPS obligation in a BIT, 
the host state has incurred the responsibility to provide internet security to a degree 
recognized as necessary by the international community in order to prevent damage 
against the websites and computer systems of foreigners that may occur as a direct or 
indirect result of a coordinated cyber attack.   
However, it is unlikely that an obligation could ever be placed upon a host 
state government to protect individual websites from targeted cyber attacks.  This is 
because internet service provision remains in the hands of private companies – 
governments are not in the practice of operating or maintaining servers that host 
websites, this is the domain of private telecommunications companies, or Internet 
Service Providers (‘ISP’s).  Host states may provide licenses to ISPs that sell internet 
connection and as such governments provide a degree of oversight, but this does not 
extend to practical control of the functionality or security of the network or individual 
websites that appear on it.  It is more difficult to propose meaningful government 
oversight of a website than it would in the case of, for example, a factory, where the 
police can normally gain access and intervene if an attack occurs. Thus there is almost 
certainly an insufficient level of governmental control to attribute any security failures 
related to specific websites to the state so as to ground FPS responsibility. Rather 
private parties, such as ISP providers may be the most plausible actors in terms of 
preventing future harm.75   
It may be fair to assert that large scale internet security issues, such as the 
integrity of a country’s internet infrastructure generally, or the stability of 
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communication networks that affect millions of users such as those affecting the 
supply of utilities, should be within the domain of governments.76 Internet 
architecture is increasingly an integral component of a functioning society and should 
be seen as within the sphere of a government’s responsibility to its citizens, even 
where some essential utilities such as internet connectivity, electricity and water are 
directly provided by private companies.  Disruptions therein seem to be the essence of 
the concept of ‘civil disturbance’ upon which the FPS standard is based.  As such, 
liability for property damage, even as an indirect consequence of the disarray caused 
to the larger system, may conceivably be the fault of the state. Under this view, a 
foreign company operating within Estonia might have sought damages from the 
government of that state for the collapse of the internet in that state, particularly if this 
was caused due to some oversight or carelessness on the part of the government.  This 
rationale must be tempered with potential emergency situation defences that a 
government could assert, such as those seen in AMT.  The more serious the attack on 
the state’s computer systems, the more likely the state will be able to claim that its 
actions were dictated by the urgency of the situation.  It should be mentioned that 
clearly where the host state plays a direct role in sponsoring or coordinating a cyber 
attack against a foreign investor’s website that has a commercial presence within its 
borders, FPS obligation to prevent harm would clearly be violated.77 
Any assessment of the duty of ‘due diligence’ owed by states under an FPS 
clause must further be balanced against the reasonable measures that the investor 
should be expected to implement to protect their own assets, much as a business 
owner would be expected to lock their premises at night.  Failure of the investor to 
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maintain some rudimentary level of security for its own on-line presence would most 
probably mitigate any host state liability in this matter, or at least reduce the level of 
compensation awarded by a tribunal. As Trachtman has argued, companies should be 
responsible for the basic security for their own systems, such as firewalls against e-
mail spam and maintaining anti-virus software, because they can prevent such harms 
at lower cost.78  
Were a breach of an FPS clause to be found in relation to a cyber attack on an 
investor’s digital investments, an arbitration tribunal would then be charged with the 
difficult task of assessing an appropriate level of compensation.  Calculating damages 
for breach of investment treaty standards of protection is a notoriously complicated 
issue in international law and cannot be fully examined here.79  It would be expected 
that damages for failing to prevent a cyber attack would likely consist of some 
combination of lost business or profits during the period where the website or 
computer system was down, the cost of repairs and or replacement value of associated 
damaged physical assets, such as machinery and computer hardware.   
  
ii) Obligation to Detect and Prosecute Cyber Criminals 
The second application of an FPS obligation to cyber attacks is the provision of a 
functioning legal system that maintains and enforces laws against the commission of 
violence against computer systems and other digital assets of foreign investors.  First, 
the integrity of the host state’s legal system with respect to the detection and 
prosecution of cyber crimes might be viewed as a more process-based feature of the 
host state environment and therefore more appropriately classified under the FET 
standard.  Pursuing the analysis under FPS, while the timely prosecution of criminals 
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ex post may offer little by way of compensation to an injured investor claiming FPS 
violation, an efficient legal response to cyber crimes could deter future cyber 
attackers, reducing the probability that such attacks will occur again.80 It is therefore 
unclear what form of compensation an injured investor would be seeking from an 
arbitration tribunal when pleading a host state’s failure to enforce the criminal law, 
except the highly contingent claim that criminals who perpetrated the cyber attack 
would not have committed the offence if they had feared detection and punishment.  
This would be exceedingly difficult to quantify when assessing damages.   
Still, laws relating to the sanctity of digital property are common in 
international law and as such could fall within a reasonable level of security as 
provided by the FPS.  For example, the World Trade Organization’s (‘WTO’) Trade 
Related Measures of Intellectual Property Agreement mandates a minimum level of 
protection for intellectual property within the WTO Member states’ domestic legal 
systems, which could assist where commercially valuable digital assets, such as 
customer information, is copied or otherwise stolen during a cyber attack.  The 
Council of Europe Convention on Cyber Crimes requires that parties must adopt 
legislative measures to establish as a criminal offence the hindering of functioning of 
a computer system by intentionally inputting, transmitting, damaging, deleting, 
deteriorating, altering or suppressing of computer data. 81 Many domestic legal 
systems also maintain laws that have been enacted to prosecute criminals for crimes 
against computer systems, such as attacks on commercial websites.  For example, 
Canada’s Criminal Code establishes a criminal offence for destroying, altering or 
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interfering with the use of data.82  State practice of this nature is evidence of 
customary international law in favour of protection against violence to on-line 
property83 and consequently should inform an understanding of a due diligence level 
of legal protection against cyber attacks that may be associated with an FPS 
undertaking.  Thus it could be concluded that a foreign investor benefiting from a BIT 
commitment should expect some reasonable level of police investigation, criminal 
prosecution and punishment for attacks on its websites and computer systems.   
This view must be tempered, however, with the realities of cyber attacks and 
associated jurisdictional problems on the internet, a full discussion of which is beyond 
the scope of this article.  It would be difficult to argue that a host state was liable to 
prosecute cyber criminals who launched an attack from outside the state’s borders 
because the state would have no jurisdiction over the matter, unless the criminals 
happened to also be nationals of the host state.84  The Council of Europe Convention 
on Cyber Crimes states simply that jurisdiction will be established if the offence 
occurs, inter alia, in the territory of a state,85 offering nothing about how this will be 
defined.  FPS is engaged where damage is suffered within the territory of the host 
state, a condition which, as noted above, would probably be satisfied if the website 
server or computer system was located within its borders.  But it is not clear that 
international practice in relation to cyber crime enforcement is definitive to the point 
that it could constitute a standard.  Many commentators have criticized the lack of 
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international regulation for crimes perpetrated on the internet,86 such as those which 
would damage the value of a company’s commercial investments.  This is especially 
the case in Developing States, which may require a contextual modification of the 
FPS standard.  
  
VI   Developing States and the FPS Standard 
As much as half of all worldwide FDI now flows into the Developing world,87 where 
the legal and political conditions are often not as stable as in the states from which 
most of the capital originates.  Commentators caution that not all governments will 
have the resources operate functional computer networks, let alone prevent 
destructive acts against them.88 In addition to poor levels of internet connectivity89 
and associated lack of technical knowledge to prevent cyber attacks, few Developing 
States have enacted laws to deal with these issues and have consequently been 
incapable of prosecuting criminals.90 Harmful cyber attacks may be more prevalent in 
states where there is a general mistrust of the government and where small groups 
with limited resources may be empowered by the anonymity and destructive potential 
of the internet.91 Such countries often have weak infrastructures or low capacity to 
respond to internet-based security issues. These conditions describe many of the 
capital importing states of the Developing world which have concluded BITs for the 
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very purpose of placating foreign investors. Uptake of security measures necessary to 
prevent cyber attacks against computer systems in these countries is reported as 
sporadic, with many developing nations failing to maintain adequate prevention 
measures.92   
A foreign investor should not expect the same level of internet security from 
every state in which it operates, as security against cyber crimes can be expensive and 
require a high level of technical proficiency and human resources.93  This is the 
embodiment of the Panchekniki dicta: ‘an unpredictable instance of civil 
disorder…which overwhelms the limited capacity of [a state] which is poor and 
vulnerable.’94 The elaboration of ‘due diligence’ under the FPS standard as offered by 
AAP hints that investors should have a lower expectation in Developing States: ‘[due 
diligence means] reasonable measures of prevention which a well-administered 
government could be expected to exercise under similar circumstances.’95 While a 
reasonable level of administration can be expected, this must be balanced against the 
context in which the events have occurred. Sornarajah writes that this will include the 
intensity of the strife and the resources that could be diverted for the purposes of 
protection.96 In addition to intensity, possibly meaning the number of individuals 
harmed, this balancing should include the nature of the civil disturbance.  States with 
lower internet connectivity will inevitably have a diminished capacity to address 
highly technical disturbances such as cyber attacks. 
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This flexibility and the risk it engenders to investors reflect the strategic 
advantage offered by Developing States.  Poor infrastructure and weak governance 
may be the very reason a foreign state can offer low production costs that are 
attractive to foreign investors. Lower costs to investors may be offset in higher 
premiums for Political Risk Insurance (‘PRI’), however the World Bank’s 
Multilateral Investment Guarantee Agency’s (‘MIGA’) Guidelines do not mention 
host state internet connectivity or the existence of cyber laws when establishing 
insurance premium levels for PRI applicants,97 suggesting that risk of cyber attacks 
against investors has not yet penetrated into the policy logic of development agencies.  
It should be mentioned that some Developing States have shown a greater willingness 
to combat cyber crimes than others98 and that improvements in this regard are not 
only an issue of technological expertise but also involve social and cultural 
dimensions, including the need for greater internet connectivity as well as the 
inclusion of local content.99  
 
VII   Conclusion 
It appears that construing an obligation on the part of host states to protect foreign 
investors’ digital assets through an application of the FPS standard in a BIT will be 
difficult. While governments may have some responsibility to maintain the integrity 
of underlying internet architecture within their territory, it is doubtful that this could 
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be extended to security for particular servers or to websites which are maintained by 
private service providers and or the investors themselves, and emergency exceptions 
could negate state liability for large scale attacks. A state’s obligation to prosecute 
cyber criminals is more likely, however laws of this nature are far from universal and 
consequently it might be difficult to fit this obligation within the contextual nature of 
the FPS standard that has emerged in international investment law and any 
compensation for such failures would be difficult to establish.  Even were the FPS 
standard be held to offer protection for digital investments against cyber attacks, 
recent tribunal decisions have implied that FPS obligations will be linked to the level 
of development of the host state and the nature of the threat which occurs.  As few 
Developing States have advanced level of internet connectivity, foreign investors 
should not expect a high level of cyber security within these states. 
Clearly the nature and scope of an FPS clause will depend on its precise 
wording in the treaty instrument in which it appears.  A specific reference to websites 
and computer systems in the definition of covered investments in the BIT would assist 
a tribunal in finding that a host state had breached its FPS obligations when such 
assets are stolen or damaged due to an organized cyber attack.  Even more advisable 
for home states of foreign investors would be to include an explicit reference to 
protections against ‘cyber crimes’ or ‘attacks on data systems’ as types of civil 
disturbances.  Given the increasing regularity of computer based attacks against 
governments and companies, phrasing of this nature should feature more prominently 
in future BITs concluded with states in the Developing world, or else investors will 
find themselves without legal recourse and host states without investors willing to 
bear these significant risks. Ultimately establishing state liability in this manner 
should be viewed as a positive force in the technological advancement of Developing 
 30 
States that currently have low levels of internet connectivity and commensurately low 
levels of internet security.  
 
 
 
